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An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between
two "parties" with different policy preferences. A "party" is explicitly
modelled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates, all of
whom face finite decision horizons.In general, there is a conflict
between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the
"party" ,whichincludes subsequent generations of candidates. We
characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of "intergenerational
transfers" within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict.
The the paper shows how the "overlapping generations" model can be
usefully applied to the political arena.
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One of the most famous results in politicaleconomy is that one should
observe policy convergence in a two-party system.In particular, if the
candidates maximize the likelihood of (re)appointment assuggested by Downs
[1957] ,fullconvergence of policies results in equilibrium: both parties
adopt the same policy. This is the basic message, for example, of the "median
voter theorem".
The assumption that candidates care only about winning elections,however,
is extreme and perhaps overly simple.In general, different policymakers may
have different views about policy and/or theymay adopt as their own the
objective functions of different constituencies with conflicting politicalor
economic interests. In this case, candidates do rt viewwinning an election
as their only goal, but also as a means of implementing the policies most
preferred by their constituencies.We believe that this view (formalized
originally by Wittman [1977]) is nre realistic and more general because it
can incorporate the case of pure Downsian candidates as a particular (and
extreme) case of the broader model. It us label candidates who are not
purely Downsian as "politically motivated".
Wittman [1977, 1983], Calvert [1985] and Chapell-Keech [1986] have shown
that if there Ls uncertainty about the distribution of voters'preferences so
that electoral results are uncertain, "politically motivated" candidatesmay
not propose fully convergent platforms to the voters. However Calvert[1985]
emphasizes that even if convergence is not complete, the candidatesmay locate
"very close" to eachother,certainly nuch closer than their respective ideal
or "bliss" points. Furthermore, if candidates are sufficiently Downsian, even
1full convergence may result in equilibrium.
Alesina [1987a] ,onthe other hand, shows that these results of partial
(or complete) convergence are time-inconsistentsince candidates cannot
credibly pre-commit to electoral platforms. While candidates have an
incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase theirchances of
winning an election, once in office the winning candidateis not committed to
her announced platform.Indeed, she has every incentive to follow her most
preferred policy.Rational, forward looking voters would account for this ex
post incentive and vote accordingly. Thus,if the candidate's tenure in
office is finite, the only time-consistent electoral equilibrium is one in
which no convergence is possible and the two candidates follow their most
preferred policies when in office2. This result holds evenif the candidates
attribute only a very small weight to their policy goals and almost all weight
to the goal of winning elections.
This divergence of policies is sub-optimal in the sense that both
candidates would benefit from a reduction of this volatility. This
sub-optimality arises from two considerations.First, each "party" would
prefer that its candidate follow convergent policies, in order to capture
(probabilistically) middle voters. Second, society as a whole may sufferfrom
excess volatility of policy, particularly of economic policy. Alesina [l987b]
provides an example of the effects of excess volatility of monetary policyfor
the bisiness cycle.In that nDdel, stochastic changes of policyrnakers with
different preferences on the inflation/unemployment trade-off amplify the
effects of the cycle by destabilizing expectations of future policies. This
excess volatility in policymaking can be reduced by several mechanisms;for a
survey on this issue, see Alesina-Tabellini [1987] .Alesina[1987a,b] ,for
2example, has shown how the repeated interaction of two "infinitely lived"
parties can sustain partial or complete convergence by means ofreputational
strategies in an infinitely repeated game. A "party" is identified in this
context by an objective function defined over a set of economicor
non-economic goals. In these papers, the candidates arecompletely identified
with the party, so that the goals of finite-livedpolicymakers coincide with
those of the long-lived party.
The identification between the "party" and each individualcandidate is,
however, unrealistic.Thus, this paper moves a step toward a more realistic
model of the party. We model the "party" as a sequence of candidates
"politically active" in different time periods, accounting explicitly for the
fact that individualpolicymakers hold politicaloffice,and that
officeholders live finite political lives.The existence of a "last period't
for the individual policymaker generates apotential conflict between the
interests of the individual and those of her party.4 Inanalyzing this model,
we will be particularly interested in the question of whether it ispossible
that finitely-lived policymakers follow "far-sighted"policies, that is,
policies which do not maximize their short-run benefits, but maximize the
long-run benefits of the "party" or even of society as a whole.cXtr analysis
provides an affirmative answer to this question.
We suggest a transfer scheme which enforces anequilibrium in thich the
policymakers, even in their last period of political life, do not follow their
individually most preferred policies.Instead, they adopt policies which
enhance the chances of a candidate of their owntype (or party) being elected
to succeed them.We view the transfer scheme as one in which fture
presidential candidates alivetoday (labelled, purely as a matter of
3convenience, "vice-presidents") compensate the "president"currently in office
for not locating at her most preferred policy.If the "vice-president" is
subsequently elected, her "vice-president" will compensateher for not
locating at a most preferred policy, and so on.The amount of compensation
(in utility terms) trust be sufficient tomake the incumbent officeholder
indifferent between her most preferred policy ex post andthe ex ante optimal
policy.With incentives to deviate from the optimal pre-commitment policy
thus eliminated, equilibria with pre-commitment become possible.
We note that the possibility of using intergenerationaltransfers to deal
with time-consistency problems was proposed originally by Kotlikoff,Persson
and Svensson [1986), although in a different context.In addition, Cremer
[1986) has studied how finitely-lived membersof an infinitely-lived
organization can achieve some degree of cooperation by nineansof implicitly
defined transfers from young agents to old agents in the allocationof effort.
4II. The Model
We consider an overlapping generations model of political competition.
The policymakers have a political life of two periods, where the term "life't
will be used to indicate the period of politically active life. A period is
identified with a term of office. Thus, there are elections at the beginning
of each period.When a policymaker is "young" (i.e. in her first period of
life), she can be either a vice-president or out of office.When a
policymaker is "old" (i.e. in her second period of life) she can be either
president or out of office.Thus, a president cannot be appointed nore than
once, although it is possible to reinterpret the model to accomodate the
possibility of reappointment (see the Appendix).Also, if a policymaker has
served as vice president when young, she automatically becomes the candidate
of her party for the following presidential elections. We note again thatour
use of the term vice-president is used purely for convenience to denote future
candidates who are currently alive.
The policymakers belong to one of two parties, labelled 1 and 2.Party 1
represents a constituency with the following objectives defined Onthe
unidimensional policy issue z e [0,1] for each period:
(l.la) W'U(z)
where U is twice continuously differentiable, and
(1.lb) =0
and
5(1. lc) U (z) {}0as z {}
b
In addition, we assume that 13(z) is strictly concave, so that 13(z) <0 for
all z. Party 2 represents a constituency with the following objectives in each
period:
(l.2a)W2 =V(z)
where V is twice continuously differentiable, and
(l.2b)
V[y'°]
0
and
(l.2c)V(z) {}
0as z {}yb
In addition, we assume that V(z) < 0 for all z. The two parties have
different bliss points and yb To fix ideas, we assume that xb >
Thus, each policymaker belongs to one of the two parties and adopts the
appropriate objectives.In addition, each candidate attributes a positive
utility to holding office per se, regardless of the policy followed when in
office.We denote this benefit by k and we assume for simplicity that k is
identical for every candidate of either party.Finally, we assume that both
candidates discount the future at a rate given by the discount factor q which
is assumed to be the same for both candidate types4.
Electoral competition occurs as follows.Denote the policies chosen in
period t by a president from party 1 and party 2 by x and Yt respectively.
At the end of period t-l, candidates announce their platforms for period t,
6denoted x and y. Voters are rational and forward-looking. Hence, they
form rational expectations of the policies that would be followed by the two
candidates if elected. Let us denote these expectations by x and y. These
expectations are determined formally as
x Et [)
and
—EtjyJ
where Etis the conditional expectation operator based on the information
available to voters in period t-l.
The electoral outcomes are uncertain. For any given x and y, the
candidate of party 1 is elected with probability given by
(1.3) Pt
This function can be justified as follows. Each voter votes for the candidate
which is expected to isplement the policy closest to her bliss point.The
uncertainty about electoral results arises because the distribution of voters'
preferences is rt known with certainty.In particular, the preferences of
the median voter are unknown.The function (1.3), then, derives from a
probability distribution over possible distributions of voters' preferences,
and, in particular, over the bliss point of the median voter.In addition,
there might be uncertainty about the number of abstensions. As a result of
the uncertainty about the distribution of the costs of voting as perceived by
7different voters5.
We make the following assumptions on the election probability function.
(1) The function is time-invariant and "common knowledge".
(2) 0 ￿ P ￿1for all e EIand all e EI,where I [0,1].
0 < P < 1 for all [xe, e] EB,where
B —{(xy)
EIx1b ￿ y ￿ x <b}
(3)P[xiy]
is twice continuously differentiable for all except,
possibly, at x =y.
(4) P1 >(￿)0 if and only if x < ()y 3x
3P()P2 > ()0if and only if x (>) y.
Assumption (4) implies that if one candidate moves toward the other's
position, she increasesher chancesof electionby capturing
(probabilistically) "middle voters".In other words, the nDre conservative
party always gains by moving toward the left and viceversa. Note that this
assumption is restrictive in the sense that it rules out the possibility of
entry of a third party for any policy followed by the existing two parties.
Assumption (1) is stronger than is necessary, but simplifies the analysis of
the model. It implies that the underlying distribution of voters' preferences
is never learned with certainty because, for example, voters preferences
change over time and new voters are born.An assumption of time-varying
probability functions can be incorporated: the only crucial assumption is that
electoral results remain probabilistic. Assumption (3) states that the
probability of winning depends smoothly on there the candidates locate, but
8admits the possibility that a discontinuity may arise when the two candidates'
positions "cross".Ps will become parent from the analysis below, however,
it will rver be optimal for a candidate to locate in such a way that her
opponent's position is between her own position and her ideal point.Hence,
this point of discontinuity will never cause any problems in the analysis to
follow. It can be shown that a probability distribution of electoral outcomes
with these properties can be generated by assuming a known distribution over
the bliss point of the median voter.
In the text we consider only the case in which each president can serve
only for one term. In the Appendix, we show that this framework can be easily
generalized to accoinodate multiple terms.
9III. Electoral Equilibrium
We first analyze the electoral equilibria in our modelwhen no
inter-generational transfers are made.In the absence of such transfers,
there is a clear conflict of interest between the "young" vice-presidentand
the "old" president in the sense that every policymaker hasincentives to
deviate from an optimal ex ante policy once she is elected.To analyze the
time consistency problems this poses, suppose that candidatescould precornmit
to their electoral platforms. Then
(3.1) and y=y=y.
Consider the election held at the beginning of period t.If the two
candidates "play" Nash against each other, then only the second period
matters, since r intergenerational utility ansfers are beingmade and r
young agent has any control over the policy adoptedwhile she is either a
vice-president or out of office.Hence, the two candidates would solve the
following problems (we drop time subscripts for convenience).
(3.2) max a[P(x,y)U(x) + [i -P(x,y)]U(y)]
+ (l-)P(x,y)k
(3.3) max a[P(x,y)V(x) +[l -P(x,y)]V(y)]
+ (l-a)[l -P(x,y)]k
0a ￿ 1.
In (3.2) and (3.3) a represents the relative weights attributed to the
10"ideological goal" versus the goal of simply winning the election (which
yields utility k). The smaller a is, the more Dowrisian are the two
candidates. If (and only if) a =0,then the two candidates are
interested only in maximizing popularity.
Following Wittman [1983], Calvert [1985] ,Chapell-Keech[1986] ,itcan be
shown that this problem has a unique solution (given the opponent's action)
which implies partial or complete convergence,so that the solution
[x(y),y(x)] is such that
b A A b x >x(y)y(x)>y
Denoting the Nash equilibrium for the model by (x,y), it can be shown that the
distance between x and y is monotonically decreasing in k, and that for each a
there existsavalue of k (say k0[a]) such that fork <k0[a],x —y.The
candidate of party 1 is then elected with probability P(x,y).The intuition
behind these results is straightforward:each candidate converges from her
bliss point toward her opponent's position, trading off "ideology" against the
increased likelihood of electoral victory.
Now, consider an old president (say from party 1) who was elected on
the platform x. Once in office, she has an incentive to break the
commitment made when she was a young vice-president. In fact, if the
president could break the commitment made as a candidate and reoptimize,
she would solve
(3.2a) maxU(x).
x
11Thus, if precommitment to a platform is unenforcable, the following
result is immediate.
Proposition 3.1. For any value of >0,and any finite value of k,
the electoral equilibrium without precommitment exists, is unique, and
b b
is given by x x and y y
This result is quite strong:since old presidents have no future, when
they are in office they have no incentive 'whatsoever to follow a policy
different from their ideal policy. Note also that since presidents cannot be
reappointed, there are no reputational mechanisms such as those studied in
Alesina [1987a,b] which can enforce any equilibria other than that of
Proposition 3.1.
Since voters are rational and forward looking, they will be aware of the
dynamic inconsistency problem and will not believe any announcements other
than xa b and yayb. In this case, the candidate of party 1 is elected
with probability P
From our analysis of the time consistency problem, it is clear that the
incumbent president and her vice-president will have conflicting viewsabout
policy.Since the vice-president must still runforoffice in her second
periodof life, she would prefer to precommit the "party" to the strategy
x(y). As proposition (3.1) makes clear, however, the president will never
implement x(y).Hence, we areleadto inquire whether there are mechanisms
for enforcing precommitment when candidates live finite lives.We will show
that this ispossibleifwe allowfor intergenerational transfers between
vice-president and president.We examine two cases.The first shows how to
12enforce a Nash equilibrium with credible precommitment. In thesecond, we
examine the fully cooperative equilibrium (i.e. the Pareto efficient
outcomes).
A] Nash Equilibria with Transfers
The basic idea behind the transfer mechanism for enforcing precommitment
is simple. Young vice-presidents make a utility transferpayment h(z) to the
old president. These transfers are a function of the policy followedby the
president in office and can be used by the vice-president to convince the
president to follow policies which are different from the president's bliss
point. By acting without considering the vice-president's wishes, the
president can, when in office, always achieve her bliss point.Hence, the
amount of the transfer must be sufficient to make the president indifferent
between carrying out the vice-president's ex ante preferredpolicy and the
president's bliss point.Hence, for a policymaker of party 1 the amount of
the transfer required to make the president indifferent between b andx is
clearly
(3.4) h(x) = - U(x).
Similarly, for the policymaker of party 2, the transfer is
(3.5) g(y) =
v[yb]
-V(y).
For the Nash game with transfers, both periods of political life nowmatter,
13since thevice-presidentmust make a rxn-zero utility transfer to the
president.Hence, the candidates of each rty will solve the following
optimization problems.
(3.6) max
(3.7) max
The first term in braces represents the pected benefits for the second
period of life of each candidate, discounted by q.The remaining terms
represent the total utility of the first period of political life.Since the
transfers remove the incentive for deviating from announced policies, the
solutions to (3.6) and (3.7) are time-consistent (and hence credible for the
voters); thus we can impose the condition that a e =xand yay6y.
The solutions to these problems are characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2. If the function P is strictly concave in x and
strictly convex in y, then solutions exist and are unique. The solutions
are given by reaction functions x*(y) and y*(x) such that
<y*(x)￿x*(y)<
Ify*(x) <x*(y)and k increases, then x*(y) decreases and y*(x) increases.
14Proof: We first show the existence part of the proposition. Note
first that we will never have x* < *sinceeither candidate can, by
moving toward the other's position, increase both her "ideological"
utility (by moving closer to her ideal point) and the probability of
winning the election. Hence, restricting the domains of the expected
utilities to policies such that yx, we see that both candidates
objective functions are continuous. Under the assumptions on F, both
problems are concave, so by standard concave programming results,
solutions exist. When P is strictly concave in x and strictly convex in
y, these solutions are unique.
To show the second part of the proposition, consider the candidate of
party 1. Substituting for the function h(x), problem (3.4) becomes
(3.8) max q{P(xy)Ea U[xb) +(l-a)k
+a[l
-
P(x,y)JU(y)}
-
+2U(x).
We may assume that y <b.Suppose x b and consider the first-order
conditions for the solution to (3.4)
(3.9) qP1(x1D,y)[c [u(xb) -U(y)]
+(1)kJ
+2U'(xb) 0.
Since U1(xb)=0,this requires that
(3.10)
U(y))
+(l-a)k]
0.
Since q >0,P1(x1,y) < 0 and the term in brackets is positive, we
15conclude that x < Asimilar argument establishes that >
Thelast part of the proposition follows from a simple comparative static
analysis of the first-order conditions associated with problem (3.8).m
To establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium, define the mapping
y(x,y) =[x*(y),y*(x)].
We then have the following result.
Corollary 3.2.The mapping -y has a fixed point.Hence, there exists a
Nash equilibrium for the game with transfers.
Proof: The mapping y is defined on the set ((x,y) EIx I Iyx). This
set is compact and convex. By proposition 3.2, -y maps this set into itself.
Since the solutions to problem (3.8) are continuous in the variables x and y
(by the implicit function theorem), it follows that -y has a fixed point.
Fixed points of -y are, of course, Nash equilibria for the game.
Comment 1. The Nash equilibria obtained above are not the only equilibria
for the game with transfers, since the sustainability of the equilibria
obtained above depends on the fact that the vice-president believes that the
transfer will be returned to her if she wins the election.7If the
vice-president does not believe the transfer will be returned, then the
policies (xb,yb) will be the Nash equilibrium policies.(This feature has a
close analog in overlapping generations models of money,wherethe
sustainability of an equilibrium with valued fiat money depends on agents'
16believing that money will be valued.)
Comment 2.In the appendix, we show how the analysis of proposition 3.2
must be modified if the president can serve more than one term in office.
B] Cooperative Equilibria with Transfers
Thus far, we have considered the Nash equilibrium of this game assuming
non-cooperative behavior of the two parties.This equilibrium, however, is
not on the efficient frontier, i.e. is not a Pareto efficient outcome.
Hence, in this section, we characterize the efficient frontier of the
game.We begin by considering the "first-best" policies.These are the
cooperative policies which would be followed by infinitely-lived parties which
can make binding commitments.To put it differently, the "first-best"
policies correspond to the best possible equilibria of the game :if we abstract
from the problem of enforcement. Then the first-best policies can be achieved
without recourse to intergenerational utility transfers, and, as was the case
of pre-commitment Nash equilibria, only the expected utility of a candidate in
her second period of life matters. In this case, the following can be easily
shown.
Proposition 3.3. If a =1,then any efficient policy pair (f,y) exhibits
full convergence, i.e. T =r•Ifa <1,efficient outcomes involve full
convergence and an "agreement" to split k.
Proof: See Alesina [1987a].
Comment.The intuition of this result is straightforward. When a =1,
17since candidates are risk averse, they both benefit from full convergence as a
means of optimally sharing risk. When a <1,candidates must compromise on
two issues: ideology and the benefits of being in office. Since any
divergence in policies away from full convergenceincreases risk without
enhancing either candidate's chances of being elected,it is clear that the
optimal cooperative outcome is to adopt identical policies, togetherwith an
agreement on how to share power.
Now we turn to the question of whether there exists a transferscheme
which can support the full cooperative outcome when binding pre-commitments
are not possible.We consider first the case of a =1,that is the two
candidates do not attribute any weight to winning elections per se.
Let us define
(3.11) ETJ[x,y] P(x,y) [U(x) +h(x)]+[1
-P(x,y)]U(y)
and
(3.12) EV[x,y] P(x,y) V(x) +[1
-P(x,y)][V(y)+g(y)].
Consider now the problem of finding the cooperative policies for each
"generation" of candidates.Each generation has to pay its transfer when
young (h[x] and g{y]) and it gets EU(x,y) and EV(x,y)when old.The best
policies sustainable with this transfer scheme can be found by solving the
following problem.
(3.13)max 4qEU(x,y) -h(x)+U(x)]+(l-) [qEv(x,y)g(y)+vy]
(x,y)
18where 0 < A < 1.
By substituting from (3.4) and (3.5) for h(x) and g(y) in (3.13), the
problem becomes
(3.14)max A[qEU(x,y)U(xb) +2TJ(x)]+(lA)[qEV(x,y)
-V(yb)+2V(y)]
(x ,y)
Note also that by using (3.4) and (3.5) we obtain
(3.15) EU[x,yJP(x,y) u[xbJ +[1-P(x,y)]U(y)
and
(3.16)EV[x,y] —P(x,y)V(y) +[1-P(x,y)]
v[yb].
We then have the following characterization of the solutions to (3.14).
Proposition 3.4. If the function P is strictly concave in x and
strictly convex in y, then solutions to (3.14) exist and are unique for
any given value of A. The solutions are , such that
y <￿<x
Furthermore,for if P1(x,y) and P2(x,y) are sufficiently close to 0 when x =y
then full convergence is not the equilibrium outcome with transfers.
Proof: The proof of existence is exactly as in proposition 3.2,
since the assumptions on the probability function P and the fact that
it is never optimal to have x < y yield a concave programming problem. That
yb <and< xb follows from the fact that, by individual rationality, the
19cooperative outcome is at least as good as the Nash equilibrium of corollary
3.2. By proposition 3.2, locating at b (respectively xb) is never a best
response to the other candidate's position in theNash game. Hence,
(respectively xb) cannot be optimal for the cooperative outcome.
To show the second part of the proposition, consider the first-order
conditions of problem (3.13).
A{qP(xy)U +2U'(x)}
+(lA){qP1(x,y)V
+P(x,Y)V'(x)}
=
A{qP(x,y)u
+[1
-
P(x,y)]U'(Y)}
+(lA){qP2(xY)V
+2V'(y)}
where
—[b]
-U(x)
and
=v[b]
-v(y).
Taking ratios yields the single expression
qP1 (x,y)U +21.1'(x) qP1 (x,y)EV -P(x,y)V'(x)
qP2(x,y)TJ +[1-P(x,y)]U'(y) qP(x,y)V -2V'(y)
Suppose that= 9 andconsider the case where P+(x,x) =P(x,x)=0.(Since
the function P(') may not be differentiable on the diagonal, we consider the
right and left derivatives respectively.) Under these assumptions, the ratio
above becomes
202 P(x,x)
l-P(x,x)
—
2
or
P(x,x){l-P(x,x)J4
which is impossible. Hence, for the case where P±(x,x) =P(x,x)=0
we have.Bycontinuity, it will still be the case that for
probability functions having derivatives at x y sufficiently close to 0.U
We now turn to the case of a 1. WL-ien a < 1, the cooperative solution
must specify a pair of policies (x,y) and a scheme to share the benefits of
being in office.Let us define k as the utility of candidate i =1,2when
the two candidates agree to share power. A simple power-sharing scheme might
involve an agreement to split the gains of holding office between candidates 1
and 2 in proportions 8 and (l-6) when candidate 1 wins, and in proportions
(1-62) and S when candidate 2 wins. These proportions could, for example,
represent shares of cabinet positions. Under this scheme, we would have
k1 —k(61+62-l)
and
k2 =k(61÷62-l).
It can then be shown8 that the optimal cooperative agreement with power-
sharing is for the candidates to adopt the policies obtainedfor the
case of a =1,and to negotiate power-sharing proportions (1'2) such that
61+62=1.
Comment 1. Since the optimal policies depend on the weights A and (1-A),
21a complete determination of the cooperative outcome will depend on the outcome
of the bargaining problem agents use to determine which particular efficient
policy pair is adopted.
Comment 2.The main implication of Proposition 3.5 is that the transfer
scheme will generally rt be sufficient to sustain fill policy convergence.
Intuitively, this result obtains because the effect of the transfer is to
guarantee the incumbent president utility equivalent to what she would get in
the absence of any transfer, i.e. U(xb) or V(yb). Hence, the transfer scheme
effectively eliminates the opportunities for risk sharing which drives the
convergence result 'then pre-commitment is possible.The fact that the
outcomes achieved by the intergenerational transfer nchanism in general do
not exhibit full convergence implies that the model of electoral competition
withoverlapping generationsis mt equivalent toa ndelwith
infinitely-lived parties.In the model with two infinitely-lived parties,
optimal fi.tll convergence policies can be sustained as Nash uilibria in an
infinitely repeated game if the discount rate q is sufficiently close to I
(the "folk theorem"). Here, we have shown that the transfer scheme may not be
sufficient to obtain full convergence even if q1.To put it differently,
the transfer scheme cannot sustain the first-best optimum (full convergence)
but can achieve a "second-best", with partial convergence.
Comment 3.We have characterized a cooperative equilibrium in which the
two parties maintain their identities in the sense that even though they share
power, they do not follow the same policies.This result rationalizes those
situations in which representatives of different parties share power in a
coalition government, but still tend to follow different policies.
Comment 4. We have assumed so far that individual candidates do not have
22a bequest motive, andhencedo not internalize the welfare of future
"generations".In this context, a bequest motive is, perhaps, equivalent to
caring about how history evaluates your tenure in office. A model with a
political bequest motive could be equivalent to a model with infinitely lived
policymakers. Barro [1974] has shown this result in a different context.
23IV. Interpretation and Conclusions
This paper has argued that the "overlapping generations" model can be
usefully applied to the political arena.This ndel captures the potential
"tension" between the short time IDrizon of an individual candidate and the
longer horizon of the "party'.In fact, a party is formed of overlapping
cohorts of individual members and candidates, so that the overlapping
generations framework seems a quite natural vehical for analyzing this
institution. We believe that the approach of modelling electoral competition
using overlapping generations of candidates has many applications which go
well beyond the particular one studied in this paper.
In general, the overlapping generations model is a useful tool to analyze
many situationsinvolving finitely-live members of an infinitely-lived
organization (see also Cremer [1986] on this issue).For the case of a
political party, one expects that there will be conflicts between the goals of
the individual candidate or elected official at the end of her political life,
and the interests of future generations of candidates of the same party. This
conflict may assume different forms:we have analyzed one of them, as an
example.In particular, we have suggested how' a scheme of intergenerational
transfers can enforce policies which are beneficial for the "party" (and for
society as a whole) in the long run, but which would not be followed by any
finitely lived individual candidate.
There are at least two ways of interpreting these transfers.The first
one is to simply view them as payments in services of various sorts which the
president receives if she is well-behaved while in office. These payments may
originate from the constituencies which supported her in the past and now are
24supporting her successor(s).They can be enjoyed by the president during her
tenure and/or after her retirement.
Alternatively, one may view the party as the institutional mechanism which
promotes and facilitates these utility enhancing transfers between its young
and old members.The transfers would then be interpreted as "dues't which new
party members pay to the party (directly as cash contributions or indirectly
as services rendered the party) in exchange for the party's support of their
attempts to gain office.Thus, "young numbers" of the "party" ork hard for
it, in exchange for the possibility of holding high ranking positions (and the
perquisites which attend those positions) later in life, when new young
members will work hard for them.
25Appendix
To complete our discussion of the model, we consider the case wherea
presidentcan serve more than a single term in office. The model developed in
the text, and the results presented there can accomodate this case by assuming
that a potential presidential candidate must pay an entry fee to the party in
order to become the party's candidate.If the candidate wins, and is
subsequently re-elected to a second term, the party returns the entry fee at
the completion of the second term.Under the simplifying assumption that
incumbent presidents run for re-election on the same platform they were
originally elected on, all of the results developed in the text go through for
the multi-term case. In this appendix, we indicate how the analysis in
proposition 3.2 must be nodified when the model is changed to allow the
president to serve more than a single term in office.
Under the assumption that the incumbent always runs for re-election on the
same platform she was first elected on, we obtain the same optimization
problems (and the same solutions) as those given by (3.6) and (3.7) when the
candidates are required to pay an entry fee to the party in order to run for
office (except, possibly, for the timing of when the fee is paid).Under the
assumption that incumbents always run for re-election on the platform they
were first elected on, only the optimization of an incumbent president in her
first term is relevant to determining the optimal time-consistent policy.If
the entry fee is paid during the president's first term in office, then the
relevant optimization problems are precisely (3.6) and (3.7).If the entry
fee must be paid in the period during which the candidate first runs for
office, then the problem becomes
26(3.6')max
Problem (3.7) is modified similarly.In this case, however, we must append
the following condition. Denote the objective function in the above
maximization by EU(x,y;h) and let EtJ(,y) be the expected utility of the
incumbent when she simply adopts her most preferred policy b. Then we
require that
qEU(x,y;h)-h(x) ￿ qEU(xb,y)
at the optimal policy with transfer. In rds, this constraint requires that
when the candidate pays the entry fee, the discounted expected utility of
running for office is at least as great as that of not paying the entry fee
and simply adopting b. Of course, if the party is in a position to enforce
the payment of the entry fee, then this constraint is irrelevant. This
situation might occur, for example, when the parties can successfully block
independent candidacies and hence, can force candidates to run within party
rules. In the context of U.S. presidential politics, such strictures do seem
to apply, and we may interpret the entry fee as the costs imposed on
candidates by the system of choosing candidates by state primaries.
27Footnotes
1.The result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general
than the udian 'votertheorem,and it holds both in ndels with perfect or
imperfect information about voters' preferences (as long as the two candidates
have the same information set). For non-median voter convergence results, see
Hinich [1977], Coughlin-Nitzan [1981], Ledyard [1984], Coughlin [1984]. For a
general treatment of spatial competition models, see Hinich-Ledyard-Ordeshook
[1972, 1973], McKelvey [1975], and the literature cited therein.
2. This result holds if the voters are fully informed about the objective
functions of the two parties.The analysis is more complex in the case of
asymmetric information.(See Alesina and Cukierman [1987].) Note also that
if there are multiple one-shot Nash equilibria, recent work by Benoit and
Krishna [1985] and Friedman [1985] shows that it may be possible to sustain
partial cooperation in a finite-horizon game without the kinds of transfers we
propose here.
3.Analogousconsiderations would hold for other countries as well. For
example, the English economy may have suffered because of the significant
differences in the economic policies of the Labour Party and the Conservative
Party.
4. Lott-Reed [1987] analyze a last-period problem for politicians but in a
different context. In particular, they do not consider the overlapping
28sequence of candidates.
5. Extensions of the model allowing for different k's and q's are
coinputationally cunibersome and add very little to the basic results.
6. Ledyard [1984] derives a function analogous to (1.3) from the xicertainty
about costs of voting. A representation of voting behavior analogous to (1.3)
is also postulated by Wittman [1983], Calvert [1985], Alesina [1987a], and
Chapell-Keech [1986]
7.We are grateful to Costas Azariadis for pointing out this possibility to
us.
8. Proof of this assertion is available from the authors
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